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"B lack" or "African American": 
What' s  In a Name? 
J o h n n y  W a s h i n g t o n  
Within the United States the African American I c o m m  u n i  t y  
has again reverted to the problem of ethnic identity and the 
question, " Who are we-- 'Blacks' or 'African Americans '?"  i s  
now being debated. I t  will be recalled that a s imilar debate was 
carried on in the 1 960s,  and the history of this identity 
question extends to the 1 920s and beyond. 
In the 1 8 90s, B ooker T. Washington advanced the ethnic 
identity debate when he impressed upon blacks the importance 
of race consciousnes s .  Following the death of Booker T. 
Washington in 1 9 15 ,  in the 1 920s black people throughout the 
African Diaspora w itne ssed a rekindling of interest in  
embracing their ethnic heritage .  The Jamaican-born Marcus 
Garvey is credited with having stimulated this  new sense of 
racial identity, placing a positive value on "blackness" and the 
African heritage generally. 
Marcus Garvey fore shadowed the teachings  of the 
Trinidadian-born political activist Stokely Carmichael.  In 1966 
Carmichael popularized the slogan "B lack Power," repudiated 
"Negro , "  and in its stead insisted on the appellative "Black." 
Carmichael, who many regarded as the father of the B lack Power 
movement of the 1 960s,  has now adopted for himself the 
personal name Kwame Toure and has repudiated "Black" in favor 
of " African American. " Toure and others argue that "African 
American" is preferable to any other term denoting ethnic 
identity because " African American" heightens among people of 
the African Diaspora the sense of affinity between themselves 
and the people on the continent of Africa. Thus, African 
Americans have a history of constant name shifting, along with 
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its underlying ethnic identity shifting and the concomitant 
cri ses ,  precipitated in part by the ever-recurring social  
processes . On certain occasions, the crises are spin-offs from 
the a s sertions and counter-as serti ons ari sing out of the 
dynamics of black and white relations . On other occasions , as 
will be seen, such recurring social processes, that include the 
assertions/counter-assertions,  impeded ethnic remolding and 
its concomitant name changing. 
The object of this  paper is not to debate the merits or 
demerits of "Black" or "African American . "  Rather, I wil l  be 
concerned with the following: ( 1 )  examining the ways a people 
ascribe meaning to the above terms, and (2) attempting to shed 
light on the underlying social dynamics that tend to precipitate 
or impede the ethnic changes and transformations that a people 
constantly undergo. In doing so I will draw on the works of the 
Afri can American philosopher Alain Locke ( 1 8 8 6 - 1 9 5 4 ) .  
Specific  attention w i l l  be devoted t o  Locke's "The Concept of 
Race as Applied to Social Culture" ( 1 924) , where he examined 
race within the social context. The application of his notion of 
"social race" to the "Black or African American" controversy 
will enable us to shed some light on this  matter. To get a clearer 
picture, however, of the i ssue, one needs to turn to the 
phi l o s ophy of l anguage,  certain results of which w i l l  
complement Alain Locke's analysis o f  race, which h e  conducted 
by focusing on cultural matters almost to the exclusion of 
language.  One of his Harvard classmates, however, C. I .  Lewis,  
made great contributions to the philosophy of language and 
epi stemology and Lewis 's  works, it should be noted, were 
inspired by the views of Josiah Royce. In the latter part of this  
paper I will  consider Lewis's v iew of  l inguistic meanings to 
shed greater l ight on the meaning of "B lack" and " African 
American . "  In this connection I will also allude to one of the 
teachers of both Lewis and Locke, namely Royce, whose view of 
interpretativ e  meaning will  be employed to supplement the 
meaning of "Black" or "African American."  
At the turn of the century, it was quite common for 
anthropologists to support a biological theory of race, according 
to which races were said to be endowed with certain fixed 
tendencies and mental capacities . Employing an evolutionist 
hypothesis ,  many authorities  held that the European race,  
because of i ts  " superior" brain capacity, had advanced beyond 
the African and other non-European races . The assumption was 
widely held that race was the determining factor of culture; that 
the Europeans who constituted the most advanced race had, by 
virtue of evolution, achieved an advantageous position of power 
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and that such a position was fixed by nature, s ince race itself 
was a fixed, unalterable entity. 
Alain Locke's "The Concept of Race" was directed against 
the above position. Denying that race had anything to do with 
biological, hereditary tendencies, Locke devoted much attention 
demonstrating that race is to be understood in terms of social 
dynamics, or culture. or ethnicity. the existence through which 
a people achieve their i dentity . Instead of speaking of race. 
Locke spoke of cultural group or ethnic group; and. if one is  to 
persist. Locke maintained. in employing the notion "race" it is 
to be understood only in the social or cultural sense. 
Locke was anxious to point out that cultures are constantly 
undergoing transformations. from which it fol lows that an 
ethnic  group is also constantly undergoing transformations. 
Hence. the ethnicity of blacks. or any other ethnic group. is not 
fixed. Ethnicity here might be regarded as a perpetual process .  
always in  the state of  becoming. But it should be noted that the 
process of becoming is not something over which members of the 
ethnic group have no control .  In fact. Locke identified certain 
factors as keys in the process of culture or ethnicity making . 
Among these Locke regarded what he called stressed values. the 
factors which constitute the dynamics of culture and ethnicity . 
B y  " stres sed values "  he meant the factors in the culture-­
obj ects. events. or s ymbols--that are highly emphasi zed by 
members of the culture. The stressed values that the group 
entertains are the ones that motivate the group to take actions 
and assume attitudes that contribute to the preservation of the 
stressed value . and of the culture generally. if the stressed 
values are regarded by the group in question in a positive light. 
Or. Locke suggested that the such stressed values may motivate 
the group to take actions to route the values in question. if they 
are regarded in a negative light. So these stressed values are the 
determining factor in the formation of culture or ethnicity. 
Thus, the stressed v alues are in p art the elements that 
constitute the ethnicity of a people. They are responsible for 
relative stabil ity as well as the changes that an ethnic group 
undergoes .  An ethnic group harbors stres sed values that allow 
it to resist certain changes that may arise internally or are 
introduced externally by contacts with other cultures . Among 
those stressed values . according to Locke. is  the factor of race 
i t s e lf :  
Race accounts for a great many of  the specific elements 
of the cultural heredity. and the sense of race may itself 
be regarded as one of the operative factors in culture 
since it determines the stressed values which become 
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the conscious s ymbols and tradition of the culture. 
Stressed values are themselves factors in the process of 
cultural making,  and account primar i ly  for the 
persistence and resistance of culture-traits .2 
Thi s  attempt to explain the social aspects of race has almost 
forced Locke into a paradoxical position :  on the one hand, 
culture is that which determined race or ethnicity; on the other, 
inasmuch · as race or ethnicity is a stressed value, it determines 
culture.  So ethnicity is  a factor contributing to is  own social 
construction. Thi s  nearly amounts to saying that something is 
its own cause; or that something is  at the same time and in the 
same respect both cause and effect. 
Thus, in view of the fact that race enjoys the process of self­
creation through the dynamics of culture, it should come as no 
surpri se that black Americans,  as any other ethnic group, 
especially those of m inority status,  intermittently  seek to 
examine their ethnic identity . Such examinations occasionally,  
but not inevitably, result in the changing of their ethnic group 
name. A name is obviously a social convention. Names are not 
fixed only to a particular ethnic group. Throughout history the 
Jews have been called by various names,  including "Hebrews, " 
" Israelites , "  "Judaeans" and "Jews" in that hi storical order. 
Earlier in the history of the U.S . ,  whites forced blacks to 
assume a negative attitude towards Africa, and thi s  might 
explain in part why there was resistance to the adoption of 
"African American . "  But obviously the stressed values upon 
which the above attitude rested, together with the ethnic name 
which the attitude expresses, are not fixed . As has been noted 
all along, ethnic groups occas ionally change their cultures . 
Locke clearly stated: "Culture is not related functionally to 
definite groups or races,  but varies independently.  Races 
change their culture on many hi storic occasions and various 
culture advances are made independently by different racial 
s tock s .  " 3 The stressed values, a shifting in the stres sed values,  
as was noted, are the factors that bring about culture changes, 
including name changes, since race i s  a symbol constituting the 
"racing of the races . "  Prior to the 1 920s "Negro" which was 
forced upon blacks by Europeans, was among the stressed 
negative values ,  forced upon black culture . The Harlem 
Renaissance of the 1 920s,  following the death of Booker T. 
Washington, witnessed an effort on the part of blacks to define 
themselves, and "New Negro" was introduced. Following the 
brief Renaissance era, until the mid- 1 930s ,  there was the 
return to "Negro. "  Then came the 1960s and "Black" became the 
stressed value, reversing the old attitude,  imposed by whites ,  
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that associated blackness with evil .  Now we are in the 1 990s 
and "African American" is  becoming more widely acceptable. 
It is  too early to identify the underlying social factors that 
are motivating this shifting in stressed values,  inspmng 
elements of the black community to seek to adopt "African 
American . "  A perceptive observer can at once discern that with 
the 1 984 and 1 9 8 8  presidential elections ,  where the African 
American Jesse Jackson participated in a serious struggle for 
the highest political office of the land, African Americans are 
experiencing a new political awakening. Then within the past 
decade or so world attention has focused on the South African 
racial crises . Such crises coupled with other factors may be 
needed to induce a paradigm shift as Thomas Kuhn would have 
us bel ieve.  Seen from another perspective,  the world i s  
beginning t o  celebrate the eve o f  the new century, the 2 1 st 
century. That factor together with certain crises within the 
culture, may be a sufficient condition to prompt blacks, as an 
ethnic minority, to re-examine their ethnic destiny . It may be 
that their contemplating their collective future--thinking about 
the next century--has led them to return in their imagination to 
their collective past: Africa, including South Africa's on-going 
crises . Such factors may have led members of the black 
community to rai se  the inevitable question, " Who are we, 
'Blacks' or 'African Americans '? "  
Here we may pause to  consider why certain names ascribed 
to or adopted by blacks "catch-on" and become widely accepted 
by the larger community and certain names enjoy only a brief 
career. "New Negro " was employed mostly among black 
intel lectuals and it  survived for only about a decade ( 1 920s-
1 930s) .  The term "Colored" in North America seems to parallel 
the history of the term "Negro," both of which were forced upon 
blacks by whites.  W. E. B .  DuBois and a few other black in­
tel lectuals would often employ "Negro, "  "Colored,"  and "Black' 
interchangeably.  As progressive as DuBois was in his thinking, 
he apparently did not see the need to reject "Negro" and replace 
it with "Black" or "African American . "  Marcus Garvey exalted 
the virtues associated with blackness ,  but he shifted back and 
forth between " Black " and "Negro , "  and rarely did he us e 
"African American . "  Apparently, Alain Locke found "Negro " 
acceptable, and he embraced "New Negro . "  Like Garvey and 
DuB ois,  Locke constantly impressed upon blacks the need to 
identify with their African heritage , but rarely, if ever, did 
Locke employ " African American . "  What psychological or 
sociological factors blocked these African American leaders 
from making this conceptual shift? It took a Stokely Carmichael 
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to bring about this total shift, conceptually and psycholog­
ically, away from "Negro" to "B lack . "  But, it i s  interesting to 
note in passing that Carmichael did not in the 1 960s move on to 
make the connection that he now makes with African culture 
and insist on the adoption of "African American. "  
N o w  we may pause t o  consider the nature o f  meanings 
connected with the employment of such terms as "Black " or 
"African American."  Certain results that C. I. Lewis achieved 
may be useful here . In his An Analysis of Knowledge and 
Va l u at io n  he distinguished between two types of meanings:  
linguistic meaning and sense meaning.4 The former has to do 
with the meaning assigned to words through our syntactic 
convention . The l inguistic meaning of "car, " for example, is 
d i s cur s i v e l y  exhibited by the meaning we ascr ibe to 
"automobile"  and "vehicle,"  by which it is meant a machine 
used mainly for transporting human being s .  One could 
substitute "vehicle , "  or "automobi le"  in a sentence that 
contained "car" and in doing so would not alter the meaning of 
the sentence that contained "car"- -that is what Lewis had in 
mind by linguistic meaning. 
A question worth posing is what is the linguistic meaning of 
"Negro, " "colored , "  " B l ack, " Afro -American , "  or " African 
American. "  But, we will not attempt to decide that here. For our 
purpose, the most illuminating notion has to do with what Lewis  
called " sense meaning. "  By "sense meaning" Lewis had in mind 
the Kantian schema, a condition or modality of the mind, in 
according to which order, and meaningfulness is imposed upon 
experience.  Lewis,  of course,  had a greater interest in sense 
meaning than l inguistic meaning, as the former was the basis  
for philosophy of  science, logic, and epistemology, and for the 
way we make sense out of our experience in general . Sense 
meaning i s  deeper than and independent of the conventional 
usage of language, of l inguistic meaning. Now, we might be in a 
position to respond to the question as to why DuBois, Garvey 
and others failed to make the shift to "African American . "  It 
may be that the sense meaning of "African American" was not 
establi shed by the culture, at that time. 
Now the question natural ly  arises ,  what is the sense 
meaning of "Black" or "African American"?  B efore we can 
answer this ,  we need to note the difference between Kant's and 
Lewis's usage of the above schema, by which sense meaning is  
derived. Kant held that such schema was an a priori, formal 
condition of knowledge. The schema does not have its origin in 
experience, and is  not conditioned by experience or culture . 
Lewis did not deny thi s a priori nature of the schema; but, 
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unl ike Kant, Lewis held that the source of all a priori 
knowledge was derived from experience, that is ,  shaped by the 
culture of which one is a part. How does the above schema relate 
to the " Black" or "African American" debate? It relates in the 
following ways . "Black" or "African American" may be regarded 
as a modality of the mind, as constitutive of the schema, 
culturally determined but which, nevertheless,  i s  an a priori 
condition,  through which  experience became organi zed,  
rendered meaningful . "Black" or "African American" is a rule 
or concept that prescribes the manner in which black people 
value,  interpret and impose meaning on their culture or 
ethnicity. So,  if "Black" or "African American" is an a priori 
concept, constitutive of the schema,  and if the schema i s  
culturally determined, molded i n  part b y  what Alain Locke 
called the stressed values , then it fol lows that the sense 
meaning that black people  ascribe to " B l ack" or "Afri can 
American" would differ from, and no doubt conflict with, the 
sense meaning that white Americans would attach to the above 
names. The reason is that the ethnicity or culture of whites 
differs from that of blacks, so much so that the difference in 
itself throws l ight on the reasons of the controversy in the first 
place.  B lacks are repudiating the names and experiences that 
whites forced upon them. White American culture owes its 
origins to a society of slave owners ; black culture owes its 
ongms to a society of slaves and descendants of slaves. Therein 
lies a major difference; from which it follows that blacks and 
whites a scribe different sense  meanings to " B lack" and 
"Afri can American . " Many whites nowadays are perhap s 
indifferent to the whole controversy and thus thi s element of 
their schema is without content. Or, the modality of "Black" or 
"African American" insofar as it is included in the schema of 
the larger society, may and often does el icit interpretations 
that are at odds with the larger element of the black community. 
Often the larger society tends to be divided within itself about 
its interpretations of the black experience. 
Besides, the black community, as most other ethnic groups, 
i s  a composi te entity,  with diverse cultural strains and 
conflicting attitudes, conflicting stressed values .  In the 1 960s, 
Martin L .  King, Jr. advocated nonviolence, and the B lack 
Panthers advocated v iolence, for example. Today, while certain 
blacks, as was noted, are advocating the adoption of "African 
American , "  the NAACP includes "Colored People"  in i ts  
organization's name. S imilarly, the United Negro College Fund 
stil l  includes, "Negro" in its organization's name. This  in itself 
is  evident of the self-contradictory attitude within the black 
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community on this  nam e  or ethn i c  i dentity question.  
Apparently, these various elements of the black community are 
assigning interpretations to the above names that are at odds 
with the interpretations as s igned by the larger black 
community. It ,  therefore, fol lows that the black community 
within itself is not in total agreement as to what sort of inter­
pretations should be as s igned to terms s ignifying their 
ethnicity. A more adequate explanation of thi s  problem of 
interpretation leads us to a closer examination of Royce's view 
of interpretation .5 
Royce's theory of interpretation was inspired by Charles 
Sanders Peirce's v iew which the latter discovered through the 
analysis of logic and epistemology. Peirce called this view of 
interpretation the "Doctrine of Signs ."  Royce broadened Peirce's 
theory to include metaphysics and the social realm .  Words , 
deeds , obj ects, events--that is ,  every element of experience--in 
Peirc e ' s  v iew,  is to be regarded as a s ign reqUiTIng 
interpretations, by which the meaning of the item in question i s  
establi shed. Royce introduced the metaphor " sign-post . "  Items 
of the universe present themselves as sign-posts, pointing the 
way for the wayfarer traversing unfamil iar terrain to establi sh 
bearings .  To make sense of the sign-posts, the wayfarer has to 
interpret the s ign-posts, an adequate interpretation of which 
requires a community of interpreters . If Peirce held that the 
pragmati c  meaning of bel iefs are establ i shed through a 
community of inquirers, Royce held that meaning is established 
through a community of interpreters. It does not require much 
to extend Royce's view to the "Black" or "African American" 
debate . "New Negro, "  "B lack,"  "Afro-American , "  or "African 
American"  may be regarded as sign-posts that point the way for 
wayfarers, especially the African American wayfarers, as they 
beat paths in the fulfi llment of their destiny. The s ign-posts 
deman d  re-interpretations by each generation of wayfarers ,  
because the social reality, the ethnicity within which the sign­
posts  are grounded,  the stre ssed values,  are constantly 
undergoing transformations. Sense meaning, of which C .  I .  Lewis  
speaks, in spite of  its limitations,6 provides a relative degree of  
permanence to  the knowledge bases of  a given culture ;  yet, 
interpretations and re- interpretati ons of the s ign-posts are 
needed in order to grasp the s ignificance of the broadest ranges 
of experience that involves both permanence and changes, 
eternity and time. These two modes of reality, eternity and time 
are the ultimate sign-posts around which a people, any people, 
work out their individual and collective destinies. To interpret 
these s ign-posts, including the ultimate ones,  it is imperative 
32 
that blacks constantly interpret their ethnic experiences which 
flow from the stressed values, from which it  follows that 
members of the black community have constantly to reinterpret 
the names by which they wish to answer in response to that 
cosmic roll-cal l .  
N o t e s 
1 In thi s  paper I employ " B lack" and African American" 
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6 Although I have been suggesting that sense meaning will 
enable us to get a handle on the name controversy, Henri 
B ergson has brought to our attention the inadequacy of 
intellectual knowledge which hinges on sense meaning whose 
foundation involves concepts and analysis.  The problem with 
concepts , in B ergson's view, is  that it  falsifies reality by 
denying the dynamic,  progressive unfolding of reality. If 
Bergson's position is applied to the above discussion, and if 
Bergson is right, and I think that he is, then we are forced to 
admit that sense meaning of which Lew i s speaks, harbors 
certain difficulties and limitations, the ramifications of which 
are beyond the scope of this paper. 
C r i t i q u e  
Aside from examining the ways people ascribe meaning to 
the terms " B l ack" and "African-American" and poss ible 
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